

Amendments to the "Guide for the Assessment of Cyber Resilience of Ships and Offshore Units"

GUI/038/AMN/01

Effective from 1 October 2020

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1 GENERAL

1.1 Introduction

The IMO Resolution MSC.428(98), noting the objectives of the ISM Code, affirms that an approved safety management system should take into account cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM Code and encourages Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual verification of the Company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021.

1.2 Aim and purpose

The aim of this guide is to provide indications for the assessment of the resilience of ships and offshore units to cyber incidents and management of related risks to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities.

The purpose of this Guide is to provide an instrument for proper management of cyber-related risk, in line with the recommendations contained in the IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) "Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management" and the IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 "Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management".

1.3 Scope of applicability

This Guide applies to ships and offshore units having on-board computer based systems (CBS) connected in networks, which can be vulnerable to cyber events potentially compromising the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability of information managed by means of such systems and networks.

The cyber events considered in this Guide are intentional or accidental unauthorized access, misuse, modification, destruction or improper disclosure of the information generated, archived or used in on-board CBS or transported by the networks connecting such systems (cyber incidents).

It also applies to ship owners or any other organization or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the ship owner (Company), and in particular to personnel and organizational units involved at all levels in the management of cyber-related risks.

1.4 Reference regulations, guidelines, standards

The following international or industrial standards, regulations and guidelines may be considered as a technical background for this Guide:

- IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) "Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management", June 2017
- IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3, "Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management", July 2017

- NIST "Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity", version 1.1, April 2018
- "The Guidelines on Cyber Security On-board Ships", v3, BIMCO, CLIA, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERMANAGER, INTERTANKO, IUMI, OCIMF and WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL, December 2018
- "International Safety Management Code", 2014
- ISA/IEC 62443 Series, International Society of Automation.

2 COMPANY-LEVEL PROVISIONS

For the assessment of resilience of Companies to cyber incidents and for their management of cyber-related risks in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM Code, the following should be taken into account.

For the verification of provisions in this section, the checklist in Appendix 1 should be used.

2.1 Policy

The Company's policy should be modified, extending its ISM management objectives with the inclusion of cyber security issues and the necessary measures for the mitigation of cyber-related risks.

2.2 Responsibility

The Company should designate a responsible ashore for the management and protection against cyber-related risks, to provide assistance to the ship responsible persons.

2.3 Compliance

The Company should take into account applicable codes, guidelines and recommendations from IMO, Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organizations; they constitute a basis for risk assessment and the Company's SMS.

2.4 Risk Assessment

The Company should provide a risk assessment (RA) and should identify cyber-related risks, safeguards and responsibilities, taking in due consideration applicable rules, guidelines and recommendations.

In the development of the RA, the differences between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) Systems should be taken into account. To this purpose, MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 par. 2.1.2 and "The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships" par. 1.1 should be considered as reference.

The following functional elements, that support effective cyber-related risk management, should be addressed appropriately (see MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 par 3.5 and the NIST "Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity"; for details on specific

aspects to be taken into account see also "The Guidelines on Cyber Security On-board Ships", Annex 2):

- Identify: Define personnel roles and responsibilities for cyber-related risk management and identify the systems, assets, data and capabilities that, when affected by a cyber incident, pose risks to ship operations.
- Protect: Implement risk control processes and measures, and contingency planning to protect against a cyber incident and ensure continuity of shipping operations.
- Detect: Develop and implement activities necessary to detect a cyber incident in a timely manner.
- Respond: Develop and implement activities and plans to provide resilience and to restore systems necessary for shipping operations or services impaired due to a cyber incident.
- Recover: Identify measures to back-up and restore cyber systems necessary for shipping operations impacted by a cyber incident.

A systematic Hazards Identification (HAZID) of cyberrelated potential hazards and a Resource Identification (RESID) of either internal or external resources (for example manufacturers and technicians for the protection of OT and IT systems that could be involved) potentially at risk should be done.

2.5 Results of Risk Assessment

The Company should develop procedures and risk mitigation measures based on the results of risk assessment. These should be effectively communicated to the crew, also taking into account appropriate roles and responsibilities and possible restrictions on dissemination of information.

2.6 Master

The Company should clearly indicate in the SMS the procedures in charge to the ship's Master, taking however into account that, when considering cyber-related risks, some tasks can be not solely the responsibility of the Master but distributed among other seafarers with defined responsibility ashore and aboard.

2.7 Support Offices

The Company should be prepared to provide qualified support to the Master from shore offices in order to implement the measures and procedures envisaged for cyber-related risk management, at least providing support on how to respond to and recover from a cyber incident.

2.8 Familiarization and training

The Company should provide suitable means to the crew on-board and the staff ashore for the

familiarization with the tools and procedures for cyber-related risk management. Familiarization and training should be periodically refreshed. The SMS should contain a training plan and describe the measures to determine training needs for seafarers and related shore staff according to roles and positions.

2.9 Emergency

The Company should include in the SMS a "cyber security contingency plan" and should provide exercises, simulations and training to prepare for emergency actions. Plans should at least include measures to respond to a meaningful set of possible cyber incidents, a description of their possible consequences and the necessary recovery measures.

2.10 Reports

The Company should establish procedures for the prompt reporting of cyber incidents, near misses and other relevant events to the managers of the Company. These procedures should be specified in the SMS manual.

2.11 Maintenance of equipment

The Company should include in the planned maintenance systems the activities to be carried out periodically and identified in the RA as mitigation measures for cyber-related risks. These activities should be duly monitored and documented.

2.12 Documentation

In case the mitigation measures include the management of sensitive data or reserved documents, the Company should implement specific measures for the management of such data and documents, e.g. limiting the access thereto to accredited persons.

2.13 Verification

The Company should carry out internal audits onboard and ashore at intervals not exceeding twelve months to verify whether cyber-related risk management is duly implemented and continuously updated.

2.14 Evaluation

The Company should verify and evaluate regularly the safety management system, focusing on the correct implementation and effectiveness of cyber-related risk management, qualification of auditors with regard to cyber-related matters, corrective and preventive actions on deficiencies found.

2.15 Continuous improvement

The Company should take into account the continuously changing scenarios of cyber-related risks and the weaknesses identified in its systems and ensure the continuous updating of the risk assessment and SMS system.

3 SHIP-LEVEL PROVISIONS

For cyber-risk management on ships having on-board CBS connected in networks, which can be vulnerable to cyber incidents potentially compromising the confidentiality, integrity and/or availability information managed by means of such systems and networks, the following should be taken into account. The extent and level of application of the following provisions should take into account factors related to:

- a) The ship as a whole, like service notation, navigation notation, overall level of digitalization on-board, extension and interconnection of different networks, etc.
- b) Functions provided by the CBS, e.g. Control, Alarm, Monitoring, Communication etc., in decreasing order of priority.
- c) Type of service provided by the system the CBS is part of, e.g. Essential, Auxiliary Commodity or Entertainment services, in decreasing order of priority. In defining priority, availability of essential systems and of systems to remain operational for the safe operation of the ship should be considered of highest priority. For OT systems, Cat.I, II and III as described in Tasneef Rules Pt.C Ch.3 Sec.3 Table 1 may also be used for prioritizing.
- d) Severity of consequences of potential cyber incidents affecting the CBS, ranked e.g. as Negligible. Minor, Moderate. Major Catastrophic. Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) can be used to this purpose.
- e) Likelihood of occurrence of cyber incidents affecting the CBS, ranked e.g. as High, Medium or Low. To this purpose, possible threats and countermeasures already in place should be identified for the systems under consideration.

3.1 Documentation

The documentation relevant to this section (see **Table 1**) should be provided to the Society either in the form of a single document, hereafter referred to as the ship's "Cyber Resilience Manual", or as separate documents.

The Company should keep the documentation up to date and in line with the changes made to the CBS on-board, network configuration, software updates and other maintenance activities.

The Society reserves the right to require additional information and/or documentation.

Table 1: Documentation to be submitted

Document	Submitted for
Inventory of computer based systems on-board and persons allowed to have access to the CBS on-board and network infrastructure	Information
Vulnerability and threat assessment	Information
Risk assessment	Approval
Protection safeguards	Information
Detection safeguards	Information
Response and recovery measures and procedures	Information
Test	Information
Maintenance	Information

3.2 Inventory

An inventory of the CBS on-board the ship and relevant networks should be provided by the Company, either as a separate document or as part of the Cyber Resilience Manual, retained on-board and made available to the Society for inspection.

The inventory should contain:

- a) The list of computer based systems, subsystems and programmable devices on-board the ship, with a short description of technical features and specific function for each.
- b) The category of each item identified in a), according to Tasneef Rules Pt C, Ch 3, Sec 3, Table
 - 1. A map describing the topology of each digital network connecting the items identified in a), including the intended function of each item, the main features of each network (e.g. protocols used) and communication data flows in all intended operation modes.
- c) A map describing the physical layout of each digital network connecting the items identified in a), including the physical location of the items onboard, the paths of network cables (for wired networks) or the position of wireless transmitters and receivers (for wireless networks), and the physical location of network access points.
- The list of software application programs, operating systems (if any), firmware and other software components installed on each item identified in a), including version numbers, maintenance policy (e.g. on-site vs. remote, periodic vs. occasional, etc.) and responsible persons.
- e) Maintenance policy (e.g. on-site vs. remote, periodic vs. occasional, etc.) of hardware and software components, including responsible persons and procedures.

The following CBS, if present on-board, should be included in the inventory:

- OT Systems:
 Propulsion and Fuel Oil system
- Steering system

- · Main source of electrical power
- Alarm Systems
- Control Systems
- Safety Systems
- Navigation Systems
- ESD (Emergency Shut Down) system
- · Emergency source of electrical power
- UPS (Uninterruptable Power Supplies)
- Internal and external communication systems
- Fire extinguishing systems
- Safety centre control system (for passenger ships)
- Bilge and ballast systems
- Anti-heeling pumps
- · Valves control and monitoring
- Power-operated watertight and semi-watertight doors (for passenger ships)
- Fire doors (for passenger ships)
- Flooding detection system (for passenger ships)
- Sanitation
- Grey Water system
- Refrigeration of food
- Lighting
- Ventilation and air conditioning
- Lifts (for passenger ships)
- Any other system whose disruption or functional impairing may pose risks at ship operation (e.g. LNG monitoring and control system, relevant gas detection system etc.)

IT systems:

- Specific Hotel services (for passenger ships) e.g. Laundry, Galley
- HVAC
- Ship Owner Network
- · Performance monitoring systems
- Networks and devices used for update of data on on-board systems (e.g. ECDIS).

The systems, equipment and technology listed in "The Guidelines on Cyber Security On-board Ships", Annex 1, should also be considered in the inventory. An inventory of persons that are granted to have access to the CBS and network infrastructure, either on-board the ship or from other location, should be provided. The inventory should contain:

- The names of persons granted to having access to CBS and network infrastructure, including seafarers, personnel internal to the Company and other personnel not part of the Company (e.g. Suppliers).
- b) Their role and responsibility in the context of the system(s) they have access to, e.g. Administrator, Operator, Maintainer, etc. with a description of their permissions on relevant data and resources, e.g. read, write, modify, erase.
- c) The access points they are allowed to access for connecting to the network(s), either on-board the ship or in other location.
- d) The time period for which their access is granted. An inventory of other persons having roles and/or responsibility in the management of CBS on-board and/or in ship's cyber related risk management should also be provided, with relevant description.

3.3 Vulnerability and threat assessment

A vulnerability assessment and a threat assessment should be carried out for the systems exposed to higher risk. The vulnerability assessment should be carried out at least for all OT systems of Cat II and III and systems connected thereto. The vulnerability and threat assessments should also be carried out for IT systems connected to OT systems, either permanently or temporarily, e.g. during maintenance of CBS on-board.

The vulnerability assessment and the threat assessment should be carried out by personnel with specific skills and demonstrated expertise. The level of investigation and extension/depth of tests should be proportional to the risk level of the system under examination.

Typical vulnerabilities should be identified by means of specific investigation tools and techniques and also taking into account available knowledge bases and/or audits of similar systems. A scoring system may be used to communicate the characteristics and impacts of vulnerabilities, and produce a numerical score reflecting their severity.

Threats should be identified taking into account at least:

- a) The vulnerabilities found on systems.
- b) Potential threat actors, including e.g. nation states; terrorists; cyber criminals; organized crime; competitors; activist groups; careless, disgruntled or malicious insiders; cyber vandals; opportunists; unaware passengers; and others.
- c) Different purposes and interests for each possible threat actor.
- d) Their offensive capability and the probability of an attack, either intentional or accidental, that may depend on the ship type, operation, navigation, cargo, etc.
- e) Available knowledge bases and/or audits of similar systems.

The outcomes of vulnerability assessment and threat assessment should be made available to the Company and provided to the Society, either as a separate document or as part of the Cyber Resilience Manual, retained on-board and made available to the Society for inspection.

3.4 Risk assessment

A risk assessment should be carried out by the Company in cooperation with other interested stakeholders for the systems identified in the inventory. Systems can be grouped in homogeneous sets or by categories (Cat. I, II or III).

The risk assessment should consider likelihood of occurrence (probability) vs. safety and security impacts (severity) resulting from the exposure or exploitation of vulnerabilities and threats identified.

The outcomes of risk assessment should be made available to the Company and provided to the Society, either as a separate document or as part of the Cyber Resilience Manual, retained on-board and made available to the Society for inspection.

3.5 Protection safeguards

3.5.1 General

Protection safeguards should be implemented by the Company aimed to prevent the occurrence of adverse cyber incidents on on-board CBS and networks.

Protection safeguards should be clearly described, either in a separate document or as part of the Cyber Resilience Manual, that should be provided to the Society, retained on-board and made available to the Society for inspection.

3.5.2 Access control

A policy for access control to CBS on-board should be established and implemented by the Company, aimed at limiting the access to authorized users, processes or devices, and for authorized activities.

The access control policy should cover at least the following aspects:

- a) Management of credentials (e.g. usernames and passwords), including periodical expiration and non-repetition; use of administrative profiles (e.g. adoption of least-privilege policy); use of credentials available to groups of persons (e.g. forbid one common account for maintenance of all systems).
- Management of physical access to all on-board network access points or standalone devices, including access recording logs and control of connection ports and drives for removable storage devices.
- c) Management of remote access to on-board systems, including enforced access control methods (e.g. multi-factor authentication), limited and explicitly agreed time windows for remote access, etc.
- d) Implementation of least-privilege policies
- e) Bring-your-own-device (BYOD) management policy, including notification to users of the Acceptable Use Policy of on-board facilities.

Procedures for testing the actual and effective implementation of protection safeguards adopted should be clearly described in order to allow execution of such procedures e.g. during inspection and verification.

3.5.3 Network protection

Technical and procedural measures should be implemented by the Company for protecting the network, including, but not limited to:

- a) Network segregation, in particular separation between OT and IT networks,
- b) Firewalling,
- c) Use of so-called de-militarized zones (DMZ)⁽¹⁾,
- d) Selection/control of IP addresses,
- e) Implementation of Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS),

- f) WiFi hardening,
- g) Use of controlled Virtual Private Networks (VPN), etc. as applicable.
- (1) A de-militarized zone can be defined as a network, either physical or logical, that provides an interface to an untrusted external network – usually the internet – while keeping the internal, private network – e.g. a ship's on-board network – separated and isolated form the external network.

3.5.4 Data protection

Devices used to store data used in CBS on-board should be appropriate for the intended use and suitable for the marine environment, according to relevant regulations, e.g. IEC Performance Standards.

A policy for the effective data security should be established and implemented, aimed at preserving the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data used by CBS on-board and relevant networks.

The data security policy should cover at least the following aspects:

- Redundancy of storage devices to protect data in the case of a drive single failure, e.g. RAID storage or equivalent. Redundancy of storage devices is mandatory for data used for Cat. II or Cat. III OT systems.
- Availability of spare compatible storage devices on-board.
- Sanity check of removable/portable storage devices brought on-board the vessel against data corruption or malware infection before connection to on-board systems and networks.
- d) Encryption for data at rest (stored) and data in transit (exchanged)
- e) Integrity checks for data at rest and data in transit
- f) Data backup procedures
- g) Secure disposal of storage devices.

3.5.5 Awareness and training

Cybersecurity awareness education and training should be provided by the Company to the on-board personnel and possible other stakeholders to perform their cybersecurity-related duties and responsibilities consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.

Drills and training updates, or equivalent, should be provided aimed at maintaining and verifying the training.

An acceptable use policy of the cyber resources available on-board should be established by the Company and notified to persons other than on-board personnel having access to on-board networks (e.g. passengers).

3.6 Detection safeguards

3.6.1 General

Detection safeguards should be implemented by the Company aimed at a timely detection and identification of cyber incidents on on-board CBS and networks.

Roles relevant to security event monitoring should be assigned and procedures defined.

Detection safeguards should be described, either in a separate document or as part of the Cyber Resilience Manual that should be provided to the Society, retained on-board and made available to the Society for inspection.

3.6.2 Monitoring of normal operation

Means for the monitoring of CBS normal operations should be provided, based on an analysis of the system and network baseline operation and expected data flows.

Continuous and/or on-demand self-diagnostics should be available at least on OT systems of Cat. II and III and on IT systems connected to OT systems. A description on how system or network abnormal operation can be detected should be provided, if not self-evident.

Connection quality and/or network performance monitoring tools should be available at least on networks connecting OT systems of Cat. II and III and on networks connecting IT systems to OT systems.

3.6.3 Real-time detection of cyber incidents

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) should be provided at least on networks with connection to shore or freely accessible access points.

Malicious code detection tools, e.g. antivirus, antimalware, etc., should be provided on systems connected to networks with connection to shore or freely accessible access points.

Means should be available to display the occurrence of cyber incidents in a timely, informative and unambiguous manner, including but not limited to attempts of unauthorized access to CBS, unauthorized maintenance, attempts to alter data or code, etc.

3.6.4 Offline auditing

Means for recording cyber incidents should be available, aimed at allowing the examination of all the events detected by the above listed safeguards on a given period of time (e.g. one week, one month,...). Event log auditing should be carried out, either periodically or after detection of cyber incidents [1.4.2], by personnel with specific skills and demonstrated expertise.

A plan for periodic vulnerability scans and security audits should be defined. The plan should consider also the repetition of vulnerability scans after maintenance activities, or changes in the network configuration, or in CBS, where deemed necessary.

3.7 Response and recovery measures and procedures

3.7.1 General

Response and recovery measures and procedures should be implemented aimed to take appropriate actions regarding detected cyber incidents on onboard CBS and networks.

Response measures and procedures should be described in a separate document or in a dedicated section of the Cyber Resilience Manual that should be provided to the Society, retained on-board and made available to the Society for inspection.

3.7.2 Response and recovery plan

A response plan for the effective and timely response to possible cyber incidents should be provided, aimed at limiting as much as possible the extension and duration of consequences and restore the relevant services to the ship.

The response and recovery plan should cover at least the following aspects:

- a) Clear description of alerts for a timely acknowledgement of cyber incidents.
- Step-by-step procedures for the isolation, exclusion, backup, replacement by redundant system, manual/local operation, shutdown, reset, restart or other measure to be adopted for the CBS and/or networks affected by the cyber incident
- Step-by-step procedures for the recovery of data managed by CBS and/or networks affected by the cyber incident
- d) Assignment of roles, responsibilities and tasks to on-board personnel involved in the response procedures
- e) Instruction for timely and effective information to and communication with responsible personnel
- f) Processes and policies on reporting incidents and identifying weaknesses and vulnerabilities in their information systems. Reporting should include also the results of the measure taken and collection of relevant information which may serve as evidence and support a continuous improvement process.

3.8 Test

Procedures for verifying the actual and effective implementation of safeguards and measures described in paragraphs above should be clearly described in relevant documentation in order to allow the Society to execute such procedures during inspection. The Society may require additional or alternative tests if deemed necessary.

3.9 Maintenance

The Company shall establish procedures for the maintenance of CBS on-board, e.g. software updates. The following aspects shall be covered:

- Roles and responsibilities: personnel involved in maintenance activities
- b) Initiation: the circumstances, or events, that may trigger a maintenance activity
- c) Planning: a description of the activities to be carried out, conditions to be met and arrangements to be made for the maintenance to be performed.
- d) Execution: a description of how the maintenance activity is actually carried out.
- e) Test: a description of acceptance tests (Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT), Site Acceptance Tests (SAT), User Acceptance Tests (UAT), etc. as applicable) to be performed aimed at verifying the success of the maintenance activity. Acceptance tests shall include functional, regression and performance tests. An explanation of how to check the current software/firmware version installed on the CBS subject to maintenance should be also included.
- f) After-service: how to provide information to the personnel responsible of or using the CBS subject to maintenance.
- g) Rollback: a description of how to restore the CBS to a safe status in case of failure of the maintenance activity.

A record of maintenance activities shall be kept up to date. Acceptance tests results shall be recorded.

Maintenance procedures shall be documented in a separate document or in a dedicated section of the Cyber Resilience Manual that shall be provided to the Society, retained on-board and made available to the Society for inspection.

In case of major maintenance activities, the Company shall inform the Society. The Society reserves the right to verify the conditions for the maintenance of the statement of compliance to this Guide.

4 STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

4.1 General

Upon Company request and positive verification of documentation and of implementation of measures defined in this Guide, a Statement of Compliance to the recommendations given in this Guide is issued by Tasneef. The Statement of Compliance can be issued to:

- Shipowners/Companies only (using the whole Guide except section 3), or
- Ships/offshore units only (using the whole Guide except Section 2), or
- Both Shipowners/Companies and ships/offshore units (using the whole Guide).

Tasneef is to be promptly informed by the Company in the case of any changes occurring related to aspects which could influence the capacity to continue

meeting the requirements of this Guide, and reserves the right to perform additional audits if the changes communicated are considered particularly relevant as regards maintenance of compliance with the requirements of this Guide.

4.2 Validity

The statement validity will expire in five years, and is to be confirmed by a yearly follow-up audit.

The statement validity will be suspended in accordance with the "General contract conditions governing system, product and personnel certification" and also

- upon Company request or
- in case the Company does not allow the annual audits to be carried out when due
- in case the Company has not met the deadline established for corrective action communication
- as a consequence of a major non conformity not resolved within the time limit established or
- as a consequence of numerous observations affecting the proper functioning of the cyberrelated risk management process not resolved within the time limit established or
- in case the Company has carried out major restructuring without informing Tasneef of these changes or
- in case the Company has made significant changes to the cyber system which have not been accepted by Tasneef or
- in case of any justified and serious complaints received by Tasneef are confirmed.

4.3 Suspension

Suspension is notified in writing, stating the conditions for reinstatement of validity the statement and the deadline by which these are to be fulfilled.

4.4 Reinstatement

In case of suspension, to reinstate the statement validity, an additional audit is to be carried out.

Reinstatement is dependent on verification that the shortcomings, which led to suspension, have been eliminated.

Checklist for the verification of compliance to the "Guide for the Assessment of Cyber Resilience of Ships and Offshore Units" (GUI38) Section 2 "COMPANY-LEVEL PROVISIONS"

Introduction

The IMO Resolution MSC.428(98), noting the objectives of the ISM Code, affirms that an approved safety management system should take into account cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM Code and encourages Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual verification of the Company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021.

The purpose of GUI38 is to provide an instrument for proper management of cyber-related risk, in line with the recommendations contained in the IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) "Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management" and the IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 "Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management".

Such recommendations are also reflected in Circular S.G. 155-2019 published by the Italian Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti, Comando generale del Corpo delle capitanerie di porto Reparto 6° - Ufficio 2° - Sezione 1ª "SICUREZZA DELLA NAVIGAZIONE" on cyber risk management.

Section 2 of GUI38 contains provisions to be applied at Company level for the assessment of resilience of Companies to cyber incidents and for their management of cyber-related risks, in line with the objectives and functional requirements of the ISM Code, IMO MSC428(98), IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 and MIT S.G. 155-2019.

Checklist

<u>Provision</u>	<u>Test</u>	Result	<u>Notes</u>
2.1 Policy	Does the Company provide evidence		
The Company's policy should	of having extended its ISM		
be modified, extending its ISM	management objectives with the		
management objectives with	inclusion of cyber security issues and		
the inclusion of cyber security	necessary measures for the mitigation		
issues and the necessary	of cyber related risks?		
measures for the mitigation of			
cyber-related risks.	This evidence can be provided showing		
	how ISM objectives have been		
	updated, how risks related to cyber		
	issues have been duly considered and		
	what mitigation measures have been		
	<u>planned.</u>		
2.2 Responsibility	Does the Company have a responsible		
The Company should	person ashore for the management		
designate a responsible	and protection against cyber-related		
ashore for the management	<u>risks?</u>		
and protection against cyber-			
related risks, to provide	<u>Please indicate the name of</u>		
assistance to the ship	responsible person and check that		
responsible persons.	his/her role inside the Company's		
	hierarchy allows making decisions and		

Provision	Test	Result	Notes
	taking actions according to his/her		
	task, e.g. having access to data,		
	information and resources that might		
	be needed for providing assistance to		
	ship responsible persons		
	Does the Company have sufficient		
	personnel and/or resources for a		
	prompt and continuous (e.g. 24/7)		
	assistance to ships?		
	assistance to simps:		
	Check how many persons are involved		
	in the provision of assistance service		
	and if their organization is compatible		
	with the intended coverage, both		
2.2 Compliance	geographically and in time		
2.3 Compliance The Company should take into	Has the Company duly taken into		
	account applicable codes, guidelines		
account applicable codes,	and recommendations from IMO,		
guidelines and	Administrations, classification		
recommendations from IMO,	societies and maritime industry		
Administrations, classification	organizations?		
societies and maritime			
industry organizations; they	Examples are:		
constitute a basis for risk	<u>IMO MSC 428(98)</u>		
assessment and the	IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3		
Company's SMS.	<u>ISM Code</u>		
	MIT S.G. 155-2019		
	<u>Tasneef GUI38-E</u> NG		
	BIMCO Guidelines		
	Etc.		
2.4 Risk Assessment	Has the Company carried out a risk		
The Company should provide	assessment aimed at identifying cyber-		
a risk assessment and should	related risks?		
identify cyber-related risks,			
safeguards and	Check also if the risk assessment has		
responsibilities, taking in due	been carried out according to		
consideration applicable rules,	recognized practices and		
guidelines and	<u>methodologies</u>		
recommendations.			
In the development of the RA,	In the risk assessment, have the		
the differences between	differences between OT and IT been		
Operational Technology (OT)	duly taken into account?		
and Information Technology			
(IT) Systems should be taken	According to IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3,		
into account.	information technology systems may		
	be thought of as focusing on the		
	use of data as information.		
	Operational technology systems may		
	be thought of as focusing on		
	the use of data to control or monitor		
	physical processes.		

Provision	Test	Result	Notes
	Check if IT and OT systems have been		
	duly identified in the RA.		
The following functional	In Company's risk management, have		
elements, that support	the five elements (Identify, Protect,		
effective cyber-related risk	Detect, Respond, Recover) been duly		
management, should be	addressed?		
addressed appropriately:			
• Identify	To check the above, the following		
• Protect	elements can be verified in the		
• Detect	Company's risk management:		
• Respond			
• Recover	Identify - an inventory of the following		
<u> </u>	items has been done:		
	assets that may be subject to cyber		
	risks have been done;		
	 personnel operating on such 		
	systems, and their roles and		
	responsibilities;		
	• Data at risk;		
	<u>= 3.55 5.7.7.7.7</u>		
	Protect – at least the following		
	measures have been adopted:		
	Training and drills at all levels of		
	Company's hierarchy on		
	cybersecurity risks		
	Control of physical access to IT and		
	OT systems		
	 Password management 		
	 Least privilege policy 		
	 Network segmentation and 		
	separation		
	• Firewalls and antivirus		
	 Data encryption and integrity 		
	checks		
	 Backup policies 		
	 Secure disposal of storage devices 		
	Secure disposar of storage devices		
	Detect – at least the following		
	measures have been adopted:		
	 Continuous monitoring of IT and 		
	OT systems' operation by means of		
	firewalls and antivirus with real-		
	-		
	time scanning and alert		
	Periodical sanity checks of bardware, software and data		
	hardware, software and data		
	Network intrusion detection		
	<u>systems</u>		
	Pachand - The Company has a		
	Respond – The Company has a		
	response plan for the effective and		

Provision	Test	Result	<u>Notes</u>
	timely response to possible cyber		
	incidents, aimed at limiting as much as		
	possible the extension and duration of		
	consequences of a cyber incident. The		
	plan should include:		
	Clear description of alerts for a		
	timely acknowledgement of cyber		
	incidents.		
	• Step-by-step procedures for the		
	isolation of cyber incident		
	 Assignment of roles, 		
	responsibilities and tasks		
	 Instruction for timely and effective 		
	information and communication		
	with responsible personnel		
	Recover - The Company has a recovery		
	plan to restore cyber systems impacted		
	by a cyber incident. The plan should		
	<u>include:</u>		
	• Step-by-step procedures for the		
	replacement of damaged systems,		
	shutdown, reset, restart or other		
	measure to be adopted		
	• Step-by-step procedures for the		
	recovery of data and/or networks		
	affected by the cyber incident		
	 Assignment of roles, 		
	responsibilities and tasks		
A systematic Hazards	Has the Company carried out a HAZID		
Identification (HAZID) of	and a RESID of either internal or		
cyber-related potential	external resources potentially subject		
hazards and a Resource	to cyber risk?		
Identification (RESID) of either			
internal or external resources	Check if HAZID and RESID have been		
(for example manufacturers	<u>included in the RA and what</u>		
and technicians for the	methodology or quideline has been		
protection of OT and IT	<u>followed.</u>		
systems that could be			
involved) potentially at risk			
should be done.			
2.5 Results of Risk	Has the Company effectively		
<u>Assessment</u>	communicated the risk mitigation		
The Company should develop	measures to its personnel on board		
procedures and risk mitigation	and ashore, according to their roles		
measures based on the results	and responsibilities?		
of risk assessment. These	Training of normanal account		
should be effectively	Training of personnel, courses and		
communicated to the crew,	internal communications should be		
also taking into account	demonstrated. Documentation should		
appropriate roles and	be provided witnessing specific skills		

Provision	Test	Result	Notes
responsibilities and possible	and/or qualification of personnel with		
restrictions on dissemination	responsibilities		
of information.			
2.6 Master	Are the procedures for cyber risk		
The Company should clearly	management in charge to the ship's		
indicate in the SMS the	Master and other seafarers clearly		
procedures in charge to the	indicated in relevant documentation?		
ship's Master, taking however			
into account that, when	Relevant documentation should be		
considering cyber-related	available.		
risks, some tasks can be not			
solely the			
responsibility of the Master			
but distributed among other			
seafarers with defined			
responsibility ashore and			
aboard.			
2.7 Support Offices	Is the Company prepared to provide		
The Company should be	qualified support to the Master from		
prepared to provide qualified	shore offices in order to implement		
support to the Master from	the measures and procedures		
shore offices in order to	envisaged for cyber risk management?		
implement the measures and			
procedures envisaged for	To verify this, at least the following		
cyber-related risk	should be checked:		
management, at	 Relevant roles and responsibilities 		
least providing support on	have been assigned		
how to respond to and	 Sufficient personnel and resources 		
recover from a cyber incident.	are available to provide support		
	(e.g. worldwide, 24/7,)		
	according to the Company's needs		
	 The Company has suitable network 		
	and communication infrastructure		
	to ensure sufficient quality of		
	service		
2.8 Familiarization and	Does the Company provide suitable		
training	means to the crew on-board and the		
The Company should provide	staff ashore for the familiarization		
suitable means to the crew	with the tools and procedures for		
on-board and the staff ashore	cyber risk management?		
for the familiarization with the	of the Hamagements		
tools and procedures for	The Company's training plan should be		
cyber-related risk	checked at least for the following:		
management. Familiarization	 The personnel participating to the 		
and training should be	training activities		
periodically refreshed. The	• The frequency of refresher courses		
SMS should contain a training	 The prequency of represent courses The contents of training and 		
plan and describe the	means for the verification of		
measures to determine	attendees' proficiency		
training needs for seafarers	dictinaces projecting		
		l	

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Provision and related shore staff	<u>Test</u>	Result	<u>Notes</u>
according to roles and			
positions.	December Community house a subset		
2.9 Emergency The Company should include	Does the Company have a cyber		
The Company should include	security contingency plan, providing		
in the SMS a "cyber security	exercises, simulations and training to		
contingency plan" and should provide exercises, simulations	prepare for emergency actions?		
and training to prepare for	The Company's contingency plan		
	The Company's contingency plan should be checked at least for the		
emergency actions. Plans should at least include			
	following:		
measures to respond to a meaningful set of possible	• The personnel involved in exercises		
cyber incidents, a description	and/or simulations		
	• <u>The frequency of refresher</u>		
of their possible	training, exercises and simulations		
consequences and the	The means for the verification of attendacs' profisional and		
necessary recovery measures.	attendees' proficiency and		
	effectiveness of emergency		
	<u>procedures</u>		
2.10 Reports	Does the Company have established		
The Company should establish	procedures, specified in the SMS		
procedures for the prompt	manual, for reporting cyber incidents,		
reporting of cyber incidents,	near misses and other relevant		
near misses and other	events?		
relevant events to the	Descibly assembles of such renewts an		
managers of the Company.	Possibly, samples of such reports on		
These procedures should be	past events could be inspected, if		
specified in the SMS manual.	available		
2.11 Maintenance of	Are the activities identified in the RA		
equipment The Company should include	as mitigation measures for cyber		
The Company should include	related risks and carried out		
in the planned maintenance	periodically included in the Planned		
systems the activities to be carried out periodically and	Maintenance System and duly monitored and documented?		
identified in the RA as	monitored and documented?		
mitigation measures for	This can be checked in the same way		
cyber-related risks. These	as for other maintenance activities		
activities should be duly	as for other maintenance activities		
monitored and documented.			
2.12 Documentation	For mitigation measures implying		
In case the mitigation	management of sensitive data or		
measures include the	reserved documents, does the		
management of sensitive data	Company implement specific		
or reserved documents, the	measures?		
Company should implement	incasares:		
specific measures for the	Check roles and responsibilities of		
management of such data and	personnel having access to such data		
documents, e.g. limiting the	and documents; check also measures		
access thereto to accredited	for controlling access to such data and		
persons.	documents (e.g. management of		
<u>persons.</u>	access credentials such as passwords –		
	access credentials such as passwords -		

<u>Provision</u>	<u>Test</u>	Result	<u>Notes</u>
	who has such credentials, how		
	credentials are managed)		
2.13 Verification	Does the Company carry out internal		
The Company should carry out	audits onboard and ashore at intervals		
internal audits onboard and	not exceeding twelve months?		
ashore at intervals not			
exceeding twelve months to	Evidence should be provided by means		
verify whether cyber-related	of relevant documentation. Possibly,		
risk management is duly	the contents of audits should be		
implemented and	checked to verify their effectiveness		
continuously updated.	concerning correct implementation of		
	<u>cyber risk management</u>		
2.14 Evaluation	Does the Company regularly verify and		
The Company should verify	evaluate its safety management		
and evaluate regularly the	system focusing on the correct		
safety management system,	implementation of cyber related risk		
focusing on the correct	management, qualification of auditors,		
implementation and	corrective and preventive actions?		
effectiveness of cyber related			
risk management,	Evidence should be provided by means		
qualification of auditors with	of relevant documentation		
regard to cyber-related			
matters, corrective and			
preventive actions on			
<u>deficiencies found.</u>			
2.15 Continuous	Does the Company ensure the		
improvement	continuous updating of the risk		
The Company should take into	assessment and SMS system, taking		
account the continuously	into account the continuously		
changing scenarios of cyber-	changing scenarios of cyber related		
related risks and the	risk and the weaknesses identified in		
weaknesses identified in its	its systems?		
systems and ensure the			
continuous updating of the	Evidence should be provided by means		
<u>risk</u>	<u>of relevant documentation. If</u>		
assessment and SMS system.	available, evidence should also be		
	given on how occurred cyber incidents		
	have been investigated and		
	<u>countermeasures updated for a</u>		
	continuous improvement of cyber risk		
	<u>management</u>		